We present a pointer
Introduction
It is not difficult to convince programmers (or employers of programmers) that programming errors are costly, both in terms of time and money. Memory access errors are particularly troublesome.
A memory access error is any dereference of a pointer or subscripted array reference which reads or writes storage out side of the referent.
This access can either be outside of the address bounds of the referent, causing a spatial access error, or outside of the lifetime of the referent, causing a temporal access error. Indexing past the end of an array is a typical example of a spatial access error. A typical temporal access error is assigning to a heap allocation after it has been freed.
Our own experiences as programmers as well as published evidence lead us to believe that memory access errors are an important class of errors to reliably detect.
For example, in
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Memory access errors are possible in languages with arrays, pointers, local references, or explicit dynamic storage management.
Such errors are particularly difficult to detect and fix because:
q The effects of a memory access error may not manifest themselves except under exceptional conditions.
. The exceptional conditions which lead to the program error may be very difficult to reproduce.
. Once the error is reproduced, it may be very difficult to correlate the program error to the memory access error.
Consider the erroneous C function in Figure 1 . This function can create a memory access error in the return statement expression.
The function will reference the word immediately following the array referenced by the pointer data if the array does not contain the token.
The function illustrates the three difficulties in finding and fixing memory access errors. First, FindToken () will only produce an incorrect result if the word following the array referenced by data cent sins the same value as token (or is inaccessible storage). This event is unlikely if the word contains an arbitrary value. Second, when (or if) FindToken () creates an incorrect result, it will be difficult to recreate during debugging.
The programmer will have to condition the inputs of the program such that the word following the array referenced by data once again contains the same value as token.
If the value of the illegally accessed word is independent of the value of token, the probability of success will be very low. Third The dereference check first verifies that the referent is alive by performing an associative search for the referent's capability.
If the referent has been freed, the capability would no longer exist in the capability store and the check would fail. Because capabilities are never re-used, the temporal check fails even if the storage has been reallocated.
Once the storage is known to be alive, a bounds check is applied to verify that the entire extent of the access fits into the referent.
Our access check, shown in Figure 3 , takes advantage of the wrap-around property of unsigned arithmetic to simplify 1We use the term dere.ference as a blanket term for any indirect access -either through application of the dereference operator (e.g., '*' or '->' in C) or through indexing an array or pointer variable (e. g., ' [ ]' in C). Casting from a non-pointer type to a pointer type is problematic if non-pointer types do not carry object at tribut es. We address this problem in Section 4.
2Our check is functionally equivalent to:
(addr < base I / addr > base+ size-s izeof(<type>)) which requires two conditional branches (or extra instructions to combine the boolean terms).
Handling of the reference operator, e.g., the 'k' operator in the C statement q = %p->b [10] , is slightly more complex as it must generate object attributes. The reference operator is applied to an expression (p->b [10], in our example) which names some storage.
We call this expression the access path. The result of the operation is a new safe pointer to the referent named by the expression.
To generate object attributes for a reference operation (e.g., '&'), we decompose access paths into two parts, a prefix and a suffix. The access path prefix is a non-empty sequence of variable names, dereferences, subscripts, field selectors, and pointer expressions leading to the memory object being referenced,
The remaining part of the access path, the access path sufiz, is a possibly-empty sequence of field selectors and subscripts (on array variables only) indicating the extent of the memory object being referenced.
We further classify access paths as direct or redirect. A direct access path refers to an object in the global or local space by name. An indirect access path contains at least one pointer traversal.
Given a reference operator expression, we can parse the access path prefix by traversing the expression tree starting with the left-most, lowest precedence operator.
The part of the expression up to but not including the last pointer traversal is the access path prefix; the remainder of the expression becomes the access path suffix.
If the access path does not contain any pointer traversals, the access path prefix is merely the name of the referenced variable.
To illustrate this decomposition, consider the C expression kf ->g [4] . i [6]
, where g is a pointer and i is an array within a structure.
The access path prefix is the sub-expression f ->g [4] .
The access path suffix is the remainder of the expression, i [61. The access path prefix is indirect.
The temporal attributes of the new safe pointer are derived from the access path prefix.
If the prefix is direct, the referenced object is either a global or a local variable. If global, the capability FOREVER is assigned to the new safe pointer.
If local, the capability allocated to the local variable's stack frame is assigned to the new safe pointer (frame capability allocation is discussed in the following section). If the access path prefix is indirect, the temporal attributes are taken from the safe pointer named by the access path prefix.
The spatial attributes are derived from both the access path prefix and suffix. The base of the safe pointer is taken from the object referred to by the access path prefix, namely the address of the named variable for a direct prefix or the corresponding spatial attributes of the referenced safe pointer for an indirect prefix.
The value and size of the safe pointer are computed from the access path suffix. Because all members of the referenced object (i. e., the member of any contained structure)
are of a known size, the spatial attributes of the reference can be computed at compile-time from type information.
In the event the final term of the suffiJc is a subscript, the spatial attributes are set to the extent of the entire array.
This technique allows the safe pointer to be subsequently manipulated to point to other members of the array.
The use of the access path prefix and suffix to produce a safe pointer via the reference operator cannot subvert the checking framework.
In order to maintain safe semantics, any pointers traversed within the access path prefix must be validated using the techniques described in the previous subsection. unsaf emalloc () and unsaf e.f ree () are interfaces to the systemdefined storage allocator.
Run-Time Support
The explicit storage allocation mechanism must be extended to create safe pointers. During allocation, a capability must be allocated for the storage, and any contained pointers must be invalidated.
At deallocation, the capability given to the storage must be destroyed. At calls to free ( ), the capability of the allocation (contained in the safe pointer object attributes) is deleted from the capability store by the call to Destroy capabilityo. Our implementation also verifies that the freed storage is indeed a heap allocation, has not been previously freed, and points to the head of the allocation (as this condition is required by free()).
The same allocation mechanism is applied to the dynamic storage allocated in procedure stack frames. When a funct ion is invoked, a capability must be allocated for the entire frame if it contains any referenced locals. Any pointers contained in the frame must be set to an invalid state. In the first example, a spatial access error is flagged when the program dereferences a safe pointer whose value is less than the base of the referent.
In the second example, a stale pointer, q, is dereferenced. Even though the same storage has been reallocated to p, the capability originally assigned to q has been destroyed during the call to free (); thus, the temporal access error is detected. %.
'ii.
iaz.
Storage management must be apparent to the translator.
The referents of all pointer constants must have a known location, size, and lifetime. With a recast, it is possible to type storage in the referent first as a non-pointer value, manipulate the storage arbitrarily, and then recast the referent storage to a (possibly unsafe) pointer.
Using a union, it is possible to create a pointer value under one field and then manipulate the object attributes of the pointer value through another overlaid, nonpointer field of the union.
The only solution that we can conceive to prevent this kind of manipulation is to attach object attributes to each byte of allocated storage. For types larger than one byte, the object attributes would be copied to all other storage holding the allocation.
In this way, any arbitrary overlaying of types would still not allow the object attributes to be manipulated at the program level.
In reality, we can provide a high margin of safety for "well behaved"
programs This test is shown in Figure 7 in the if statement surrounding the bounds check. It may be useful to memoize more than one set of operands.
In our implementation, we memoize both the effective address of the last dereference, i.e., use of the C operator '*', and the effective address of the last subscript operation, t. e., use of ' [ ]'. Changes in the former can be tracked with only a single "dirty" bit, set when the pointer value is changed. Changes in the latter are tracked by retaining a copy of the last index applied to the pointer value.
To elide temporal checks, we keep a copy of a global counter, incremented when storage is deallocated, in the safe pointer.
If this counter, which we call the~ree counter, has not changed since the last temporal check, the referent has not been freed and the temporal check can be safely elided. In the first phase, the algorithm seeds the data-flow analysis by approximating all out sets. For all blocks except the entry block, the value of out [1?;] is set to all check expressions less those killed by the block l?,, i.e., U -kill [B,].
For the program entry block, Ell, we must assume that no checks are available, hence, in[131 ] is set to empty and OUt[B1] is set to the checks generated in the entry block B1. In the second phase, the data-flow framework is solved to determine where check expressions reach in the program. For a check expression to reach a node B%, it must be available at B, for all executions, that is, it must be available in the out sets of all predecessors to block B,. This requirement is precisely why the confluence operator is intersection. After the data-flow computation converges on a solution, i. e., change == false, the set in[B,] contains all checks that reach block 15~.
In the third phase, the in sets are used to elide redundant checks. Checks may be elided wherever a lexically identical or equivalent (if more powerful tests are applied) check is available in the block (i. e., the same check is in the in set of the block).
The base, 4 byte size, a 1 byte storage class specifier, and a 2 byte capability.
For run-time check optimization, we added a 1 byte dirty flag, a 4 byte last index, and a 2 byte free counter for a total size of 22 bytes (450% overhead).
Due to a bug in the C++ compiler, we could not use sizeof () in the safe pointer implementation if the referent referred to itselfi as a result, B C, AIin-Span, and Partition all required the size of the referent to be stored in the safe pointer, which added a 4 byte overhead for these programs.
There were no space overheads for array variables, as all required object attributes are known at compile-time.
We only rewrote the actual program code, all system library routines remained unchecked. We did, however, perform interface checking.
Whenever a system library is called, any pointer arguments are validated against the time and space bounds expected by the library routine.
For example, if a call were made to f read (), the interface check would ensure that the destination of the read was live storage and that the entire length of the read operation would fit into the referent.
6.3
Results Figure  9 shows the execution overheads for the analyzed programs.
The Unopt columns show total dynamic instruction counts for executions with no optimization, and the Opt columns show instruction counts with run-time resolved optimization.
For the run-time optimized executions, the normalized instruction counts range from 2.3 ( YA CR-2) to 6.4 (B@. This overhead reflects program performance without any compiletime optimization.
While this performance degradation will likely be acceptable for the development cycle of short or medium length program executions, it may still be prohibitively expensive for very long running programs, and it is certainly too costly a price to pay for in-field instrumentation of a program.
Examining more closely the breakdown of the execution overheads yields much insight into how the performance of our checking methodology could be improved. For each program, we break down the overhead costs into five categories.
We measured this cost by compiling and running the program repeatedly with incrementally more functionality in the safe pointer implementation. Original Program is the instruction count for the unchecked program, always normalized to one.
User Defined
Ptr is the cost in our framework for implementing all pointers as structures at the user level. The primary factors affecting performance here are increased loads, stores, and function calls. The first factor is due to the MIPS cc compiler's handling of structure variables; once wrapped in a structure, the field variables are no longer eligible for reg- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n . . . . . .. .. . . . .. With faster checks, compile-time optimization, and spatially complex programs, this trade-off becomes even more acute.
Since Anagram, Backprop, and YACR-2 must execute many of their checks (t?9~0, 67Y0, and 86% respectively), they do not benefit from the run-time optimizations. For YACR-2, the effects are much less pronounced because dereferences aremuch less frequent (asshownin Table l ).
The second effect to observe when comparing the optimized to unoptimized execution costs is that the greatest benefit of run-time check optimization always comes from eliding temporal checks. We see the solution to these problems as better integration between the safe compiler and the code generator.
Our prototype implementation, while successful at showing the viability of our compile-time safe programming methods, leaves many questions of efficiency and usability unanswered. We are addressing these issues with the development of our fully automatic, optimizing Saje-C compiler.
